.MASSHOLE.Syria was already destabilized, the Arab Spring saw to that.
And McCain wasn't and never would be seen with an Al-Qaeda operative.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/world/middleeast/try-as-he-may-john-mccain-cant-shake-falsehoods-about-ties-to-isis.html
As I stated above, the US would never arm ISIS as it was an off-shoot of Al Qaeda. The US knew this and instead attempted to arm the moderates of the FSA and their allies. Unfortunately, they underestimated the reliability of some of the FSA allies who were either killed or absorbed by ISIS. ISIS grew at an alarming rate in an environment that was always changing. As to your claim about letting ISIS expand, well I cannot comment because that whole anti-Assad group was shifting almost every day.
The US goal in December 2006 was to undermine the Syrian government by any means necessary. This is a fact. And that what mattered was whether US action would help destabilize the government., not what other impacts the action might have... In public, the US was opposed to Islamist terrorists everywhere; but in private it saw the potential threat to the legitimate government of Syria from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists as an opportunity that the US should take action to try to increase. Destabilisation is and will always be a requirement for overthrowing a government. It's the primary reason an external force would do so. The other agenda seems to be the elimination of the Shia powerbloc for Western and Saudi interests, point blank. That is the motive.
You look at the "arab spring", Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Ukraine, and Syria and realize there's a similar strategy at play.
Now If US covert operations are not directly behind the dissent and protests in these countries as these wikileaks document would suggest they are directly behind it, we're coming in after the fact and supporting the dissenters.
December 13, 2006 cable, "Influencing the SARG [Syrian government] in the End of 2006,"1 indicates that, as far back as 2006 - five years before “ARAB SPRING" protests in Syria - destabilizing the Syrian government was a central motivation of US policy. The author of the cable was William Roebuck, at the time chargé d'affaires at the US embassy in Damascus. The cable outlines strategies for destabilizing the Syrian government. In his summary of the cable,
Roebuck wrote: We believe Bashar's weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising.
So yes, there was the possibility of estabilishing a declared salafist principality in eastern syria and this is exactly what the supporting powers ti the opposition want, in order to isolate the syrian regime
aqi , through the spokesman islamic state of iraq (x.y.) declared the syrian regime is the forefront ot shiites and called on all sunnies in iraq to vage war against the syrian regime.
... redacted redacted ...
The "possible actions" that were suggested in the cable:
-- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal angst and may lead him to act irrationally. ...
-- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal angst and may lead him to act irrationally. ...
-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. ... we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.
-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most elements of Syrian society. ...
-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him with venues for airing the SARG's dirty laundry. ...
-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING: The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif'at Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate leaking of the meetings afterwards.
-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM: Highlighting failures of reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly embarrassing and de-legitimizing. Comparing and contrasting puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East would also embarrass and irritate Bashar.
-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF: Syria has enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up steam. ...
-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish complaints in public statements, including publicizing human rights abuses will exacerbate regime's concerns about the Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish areas and the SARG's long-standing refusal to offer citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. This issue would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society's skepticism of Kurdish objectives.
-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused) extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas and PIJ. Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and uncontrolled blowback. The SARG's argument (usually used after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of terrorism should be used against it to give greater prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria.
source:
http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf?V=1
https://www.newschoolers.com/videos/watch/795421/General-Wesley-Clark--Wars-Were-Planned---Seven-Countries-In-Five-Years
